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Abstract 
 
It has been observed lately that the dependence on moneylenders for borrowing needs of poor 
borrowers remained stable despite the presence of MFIs, particularly in developing economies. 
This is surprising given the fact that MFIs charge relatively lower interest rate as compared to 
moneylenders. The paper explains this trend by arguing that the effective cost of borrowing from 
MFI is higher relative to the effective cost of borrowing from moneylender. It is due to the 
additional burden incurred in the form of transaction costs in case of MFI borrowing. Simulation 
results also support this phenomenon 
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1. Introduction 
Some recent estimates show that there are about 3,600 microfinance institutions (MFIs) serving 
about 190 million clients, of which nearly 130 million are poorest (Reed, 2011 as cited in Goto, 
2012). This translates to the impact of microfinance on one in every 37 people on earth (ibid.).  It 
is largely driven by following the group lending model of Grameen Bank in the form of self-help 
group (SHG) bank - borrower linkage program in the Indian context. According to Sa-dhan, an 
association of MFIs in India, group loans account for more than 90% of the total loans disbursed 
by MFIs in India (Shankar, 2007). 
The success of microfinance group lending has led to an extensive and growing literature on the 
subject.  The models of Stiglitz (1990), Besley and Coate (1995), Ghatak (1999) , Aghion (1999) 
and Aghion and Gollier (2000) show how Grameen type group lending with joint liability  helps 
to mitigate the effect of information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower by exploiting 
the local information about the borrowers. This is made possible through borrowers’ participation 
in group formation, peer monitoring, and imposing social sanctions on the defaulting borrowers, 
among others.  
Notwithstanding the extensive and still growing literature on microfinance and group lending, 
most theoretical literature has approached the group based lending from the lenders’ perspective. 
Under group lending with joint liability, dynamic incentives and weekly repayment schedule, 
lenders can charge lower interest rate due to decreased information asymmetry (and consequent 
reduction in cost of screening and monitoring of borrowers) and yet achieve high repayment rate.  
This is a perspective from the lender.   However, borrowers need to bear transaction costs when 
they borrow in groups. This includes the opportunity cost of attending weekly repayment meetings, 
cost of travelling to attend meetings etc. The problem of borrowers’ transaction costs in group 
lending has been discussed by Chung (1995), Bhatt and Tang (1998) (who term these costs as 
‘hidden beasts’), Pal (2002), Karduck and Seibel (2004), Dehem and Hudon (2013), among others. 
With the inclusion of these transaction costs in the regular interest cost, the effective cost of 
borrowing from MFI may increase up to the level of cost of borrowing from moneylenders (ML) 
and this may defeat the very purpose of introducing group-based lending and reducing dependence 
on ML who are observed to charge very high interest rates.  
3 
 
In this paper, we attempt to understand the trade-off that a typical borrower faces when she has a 
choice of borrowing from MFI or from ML. The trade-off originates because of the additional 
burden on the borrower in the form of transaction cost when she borrows from MFI while at the 
same time incurring a relative lower interest cost. On the other hand, borrowing from ML comes 
at higher interest cost without incurring any transaction cost. Hence, there is no unambiguous 
answer to the question of which option (borrowing from MFI or from ML) is viable from the 
borrower’s perspective assuming the unavailability of competing MFIs. 
We provide a theoretical framework around the effective cost of borrowing from MFI. We consider 
two alternative frameworks. The first framework expresses transaction cost as a mark-up over the 
interest cost and computes the total cost of credit using the internal rate of return (IRR) 
methodology. We name this as effective MFI interest rate. The second framework expresses the 
effective cost of MFI borrowing in terms of borrowers’ payoff functions and compares it with the 
effective cost of ML borrowing per unit of capital. This determines the maximum MFI interest rate 
at which the effective cost of MFI borrowing remains lower than that of ML borrowing. We call 
this maximum MFI interest rate as reservation MFI interest rate. 
We extend the theoretical results derived on effective MFI interest rate and reservation MFI 
interest rate by performing numerical simulations. The parameter estimates to perform simulations 
are taken from transaction cost estimation studies done in the Indian context, primarily Karduck 
and Seibel (2004), Shankar (2007), Dehem and Hudon (2013), among others. Results show that 
the effective cost of borrowing from MFI is higher or lower relative to the effective cost of 
borrowing from ML depending upon credit requirement, transaction cost burden, installment size, 
among others. Borrowers may find comparative advantage in borrowing individually from ML as 
compared to borrowing in a group from MFI when the credit requirement is low as in the case of 
poor and marginal borrowers. These results partly explain the relative stable dependence on ML 
credit market in economies having group lending microcredit activities. 
The paper is organized into five sections. This introductory section gives an overview about the 
context, objective and a brief mention of results derived. Section 2 and 3 formulates expressions 
for effective MFI interest rate and reservation MFI interest rate respectively. It is followed by the 
simulation results on effective MFI interest rate and reservation MFI interest rate in sub-sections 
4.1 and 4.2 respectively. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Effective MFI interest rate 
We assume that there is a project which requires an investment of amount K at the beginning of 
period 1 and will realize returns at the end of period 2 with full certainty. The project is assumed 
to be indivisible implies investment of amount less than K will not produce any returns in period 
2. There is an MFI which offers group loans at an interest rate of r (r > 0), while ML provides 
individual loans at an interest rate of m, where m > r.  MFI contract involves repaying in 
installments, while ML contract does not involve any installments and the entire loan amount needs 
to get repaid at the end of period 2.  
Borrowers are assumed to be identical and are endowed with a project requiring an investment of 
amount K. In addition, they are assumed to be poor and marginal with no personal wealth and 
cannot afford to offer any collateral. The representative borrower needs to repay some amount, s,  
to MFI with interest r as an installment at the end of period 1, and the remaining (K - s) with 
interest at the end of period 2 (Jain and Mansuri, 2003). It is assumed that there is no restriction 
on the amount borrowed either from MFI or from ML.  
When a borrower borrows from MFI, she incurs transaction costs, Tc (Tc > 0) and is assumed to be 
fixed. On the other hand, borrowing from ML does not involve any transaction costs for the 
borrower. Ahmed (1989) argues that transaction costs are primarily incurred prior to or at the time 
of obtaining the loan. Hence, we assume that the net effective amount borrowed for an individual 
borrower reduces to (K – Tc) (Ahmed, 1989; Rojas& Rojas, 1997). Also, we assume that MFI 
charges interest rate on flat rate basis. It implies that interest liability is calculated as a fixed 
percentage of the initial loan amount rather than the amount outstanding (declining) during the 
loan term.  
Suppose E is the effective MFI interest rate (E > 0) and A1, A2 are the repayments to MFI at the 
end of 1st and 2nd period respectively. We assume that MFI is profit maximizer period by period 
(Jain, 1999; Aghion, 1999) and repayments happen with interest in both first and second period. 
A1 is the amount of first installment (s) paid to MFI with interest at the end of first period and A2 
is the remaining amount (K – s) to be repaid with interest at the end of second period.  
To determine the effective MFI interest rate, we use the method of internal rate of return (IRR). 
The IRR method is used to determine the rate at which the future cash outflows should be 
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discounted so that its present value equalizes the effective amount borrowed. Given the assumption 
of two periods and making use of IRR formula, we have the following: 
 
 
Putting 1A s(1 r)   and 2A (K s)(1 r)   , the above expression is re-written as: 
c
2
s(1 r) (K s)(1 r)
K T
(1 E) (1 E)
  
  
 
 
Solving for E yields the following effective MFI interest rate E*, 
   
 
2 2
c c
c
4(K s)(1 r) K T s (1 r) s(1 r) 2 K T
E*
2 K T
        


                       (1) 
Proof: See Appendix 1 
For E* to have meaningful value, the term inside square root should be non-negative. This always 
holds true when we have K > Tc. The restriction on amount borrowed (K) being larger than 
transaction costs (Tc) is in congruence with the transaction costs estimation studies done in the 
Indian context like Karduck and Seibel (2004), Dehem and Hudon (2013) etc.  
The comparative statics results on the effective MFI interest rate show that: 
Lemma 1 An increase in transaction cost leads to increase in effective interest rate. 
Lemma 2 The relation between effective interest rate and amount borrowed is negative. 
Lemma 3 An increase in actual MFI interest rate charged results in an increase in effective MFI 
interest rate. 
Lemma 4 There is a positive relation between MFI installment amount and effective MFI interest 
rate. 
Proof: See Appendix 2  
The above lemmas establish that effective MFI interest rate is higher than the actual MFI interest 
rate when Tc is assumed to be high or K is relatively low or both. This is shown by lemma 1 and 
1 2
c
2
A A
K T
(1 E) (1 E)
  
 
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lemma 2 wherein the relation between E* and Tc is positive and the relation between E* and K is 
negative. Lemma 3 shows an increased interest cost burden results in an increased effective cost 
of borrowing. An increased installment size is also associated with higher effective MFI interest 
rate. This is due to the fact that the installment amount s if gets invested at the end of period 1 
(instead of paying back to MFI) will earn some returns by the end of period 2. Hence, there is an 
opportunity cost involved in spending the amount s to repay MFI installment at the end of period 
1. This leads to higher effective cost of borrowing from MFI.   
3. Reservation MFI interest rate 
In this section, we attempt to provide an alternative theoretical framework to the trade-off of 
borrowing from MFI or from ML in the form of borrowers’ payoff functions. As in the previous 
section, we assume that MFI contracts are group lending contracts while the ML contracts are 
individual contracts. The interest rate charged by MFI (r) is lower while that of ML (m) is higher. 
There is a project which requires an investment of amount K (K > 0) at the beginning of period 1 
and is expected to fetch returns at the end of period 2. A representative borrower is assumed to be 
poor and marginal with no ability to offer collateral. 
The MFI group lending contract specifies an installment amount s which needs to be repaid at the 
end of period 1 and the remaining amount (K – s) needs to be repaid at the end of second period 
with interest. Since returns are only realized at the end of period 2, hence the borrower borrows 
from ML an amount of s(1+r) to repay MFI installment  (Jain and Mansuri, 2003). There are 
transaction costs Tc involved in borrowing from MFI. Tc indicates total transaction cost burden per 
member in a group of 2 members. Therefore, the effective cost of borrowing from MFI (ECMFI) 
per unit of amount borrowed for an individual borrower becomes: 
 MFI c
1
EC s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r) T (1 r)
K
                                 (2) 
The first component, s(1+r)(1+m), is the amount which needs to be repaid to ML at the end of 
second period with interest rate m. The second component, 2(K-s)(1+r), is the residual amount 
which needs to be paid back to MFI adjusted for joint liability (assuming 100% joint liability share 
and probability of default). The last component, Tc(1+r), is the opportunity cost of transaction cost 
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amount, assuming that if it gets invested, it will earn returns at the rate of r. The whole expression 
is divided by K to get per unit cost.  
The effective cost of borrowing from ML (ECML) per unit of amount borrowed for an individual 
borrower takes the following form: 
ML
K(1 m)
EC (1 m)
K

                               (3) 
The component K(1+m) is the total cost of borrowing when she borrows the entire amount K from 
ML. The expression is divided by the amount borrowed K to get per unit cost. 
To derive an expression for the maximum MFI interest rate r at which the effective cost of 
borrowing from MFI remains lower than that of ML, we put 
MFI MLEC EC  
 c
1
s(1 r)(1 m) 2(K s)(1 r) T (1 r) (1 m)
K
           
Solving for r leads to the following,  
c
K(1 m)
(1 r)
s(1 m) 2(K s) T

 
   
 
c
c
(K s)(m 1) T
r r*
s(1 m) 2(K s) T
  
 
   
                            (4) 
where  
c
c
(K s)(m 1) T
r*
s(1 m) 2(K s) T
  

   
 
r* can be interpreted as the ‘reservation’ level of MFI interest rate at which the effective cost of 
borrowing per unit of amount borrowed from MFI and from ML are equal. At this reservation MFI 
interest rate, the borrower is indifferent between borrowing from MFI and borrowing from ML. 
When the actual interest rate charged r is greater than r*, the effective cost of borrowing from MFI 
exceeds the effective cost of borrowing from ML and borrower will prefer to borrow from ML. 
The opposite holds true when the actual interest rate charged r is lower than r*. Therefore,  
If r > r*, then ECMFI > ECML                            (5) 
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If r < r*, then ECMFI < ECML                            (6) 
However, the reservation r* derived above can take negative values also particularly when 
transaction costs are too high. As shown in equation (6), if r is lower than r* then the effective cost 
of borrowing from MFI is less and borrower will prefer to borrow from MFI. However, if r* is 
negative, MFI cannot offer loans at r lower than r*. This is due to the assumption of MFI being 
profit maximizer. For r* to be non-negative, it must satisfy the condition of c(K s)(m 1) T   . 
The installment amount s cannot be greater than the amount borrowed K which implies the 
expression (K – s) is non-negative. Transaction costs Tc is assumed to be strictly positive. Hence, 
to satisfy the condition of c(K s)(m 1) T   , ML interest rate m has to be at least of the level of 
1. 
The comparative statics results on reservation MFI interest rate are used to derive the following 
lemmas: 
Lemma 5 Reservation interest rate falls with the increase in transaction cost.  
Lemma 6 An increase in amount borrowed results in an increase in reservation level of interest 
rate. 
Lemma 7 There is a positive relation between ML interest rate and reservation interest rate. 
Lemma 8 A marginal increase in installment amount is associated with a lower level of reservation 
MFI interest rate. 
Proof: See Appendix 3 
Lemma 5 implies borrower will be willing to pay lower r* to MFI if Tc increases. Higher amount 
borrowed is associated with higher reservation MFI interest rate. This implies MFI’s pool of clients 
gets increased with the higher K and consequent increase in r* as shown by equation (6). An 
increase in ML interest rate increases the cost of alternate source of credit (ML) and hence leads 
borrowers willing to pay higher r* to MFI. An increase in installment amount raises the amount 
borrowers need to borrow from ML, s(1 + r), to repay MFI installment. ML loans are availed at 
higher interest cost m. This translates to relative lower borrowing from MFI and is associated with 
lower level of reservation r*. 
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4. Simulation results 
To gain some insight to the theoretical results derived above, we perform simulations on the 
effective MFI interest rate E* and reservation MFI interest rate r*, changing one of the parameters 
among s, K, m, r and Tc at a time, while keeping others at some constant value. The range of 
parameter estimates are taken from reviewing some of the empirical studies done in the Indian 
context. The most relevant in our context are Karduck and Seibel (2004), Banerjee and Duflo 
(2010), Dehem and Hudon (2013), Pradhan (2013) and Seenivasan (2015). Although Shankar 
(2007) also estimated transaction costs in the Indian context, however the attempt was made from 
the lender’s (MFI) perspective and not from the borrower’s perspective.  
Karduck and Seibel (2004) estimated average loans outstanding from SHGs at INR (Indian Rupee) 
6,690 per member annually at the lending rate of around 24% per annum. The annual transaction 
cost is estimated at INR 156 per member. Banerjee and Duflo (2010) pegged ML interest rate of 
around 57% per annum. Dehem and Hudon (2013) estimated average loan size separately for rural 
and urban borrowers at around INR 3,884 and INR 3,878 per borrower respectively. There is a 
wide variation observed in average annual transaction costs among rural and urban borrowers at 
an approximate of INR 290 and INR 350 per member respectively. Pradhan (2013) observed that 
ML interest rate varies to the extent of 50% or more in the Indian context. The paper showed 
around one-third of the ML debt is borrowed at an interest rate of around 20-25%, while another 
one-third (approx. 38%) is borrowed at an interest rate of more than 30%.  
In particular, we consider the parameter range of K between 3800 and 6800, Tc between 150 and 
400, and s between 1500 and 3500. We consider the r values varying in the range of 12% and 25%, 
and m values varying in the range of 100% and 200% in the respective simulation results on 
effective MFI interest rate and reservation MFI interest rate.  While keeping parameter values at 
some constant level, we have kept r at 24% as per the RBI mandate in the Indian context (Karduck 
and Seibel, 2004; Seenivasan, 2015). The installment amount (s) is assumed to be one half of 
amount borrowed (K) in most of the simulation cases shown below. The relevant graphs are shown 
in the respective cases. The graphs below plot effective MFI interest rate/reservation MFI interest 
rate on Y-axis and the parameter considered on X-axis. 
4.1 Simulation results on effective MFI interest rate  
10 
 
We consider four cases in total described in Table 1 below. We fix three parameters at a time and 
change any one of the parameters among s, K, Tc and r. This is shown under header Fixed 
(parameters fixed at a particular value) and Variable (parameter changing value in a continuous 
range) in the table below. We consider four to five parameter combination values for each case. 
These four cases on effective MFI interest rate are shown in figures 1 to 4. 
Table 1: Parameter combinations considered in simulation results on effective MFI interest 
rate 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
s, K, Tc r (0.12, 0.25) s, r, Tc K (3800, 6800) 
a) s = 1950, K = 3900, Tc = 350  a) s = 1950, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
b) s = 1950, K = 3900, Tc = 290 b) s = 1950, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
c) s = 3350, K = 6700, Tc = 350 c) s = 3350, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
d) s = 3350, K = 6700, Tc = 290 d) s = 3350, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
e) s = 3350, K = 6700, Tc = 160 e) s = 3350, r = 0.24, Tc = 160 
 
Figure 3 Figure 4 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
s, r, K Tc (150, 400) r, K, Tc s(1500, 3500) 
a) s = 1950, r = 0.24, K = 3900 a) K = 3900, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
b) s = 2800, r = 0.24, K = 3900 b) K = 3900, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
c) s = 3350, r = 0.24, K = 6700 c) K = 6700, r = 0.24, Tc = 350 
d) s = 5000, r = 0.24, K = 6700 d) K = 6700, r = 0.24, Tc = 290 
 e) K = 6700, r = 0.24, Tc = 160 
Source: The author 
The graph in figure 1 shows effective interest rate E on Y-axis and actual interest rate r on X-axis. 
When amount borrowed is relatively high (6700), effective interest rate turns out to be lower than 
actual interest rate r in the entire range of r (0.12, 0.25). It holds true for all the three cases c, d and 
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e. At the lower K values (3900), effective interest rate E is higher than actual interest rate r under 
certain combination of parameter values (s, Tc). However, with K being 6700, E becomes lower 
than r because of economies of scale. 
Figure 1: Effective MFI interest rate as a function of interest rate r 
 
Source: The author 
The graph in figure 2 shows effective interest rate E on Y-axis and amount borrowed K on X-axis. 
The divergence in effective interest rate among the five cases considered is high at lower values 
of amount borrowed and becomes lower as K increases.  Graphs show with the increase in amount 
borrowed K, effective interest rate converges to the actual interest rate of 0.24, and after a certain 
threshold becomes lower than 0.24. When the installment size is small (1950), effective rate is 
shown to be lower than interest rate r in the entire range of K considered (3800, 6800). This holds 
true for both cases a and b. Effective rate becomes higher than r when the amount borrowed is low 
and installment size as a percentage of amount borrowed is high. 
Figure 2: Effective MFI interest rate as a function of amount borrowed K 
 
Source: The author 
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The graph in figure 3 puts effective interest rate E on Y-axis and transaction costs on X-axis. The 
change in effective rate with response to a unit change in transaction cost also depends upon the 
amount borrowed. The curve is relatively steeper for cases a and b when K is small (3900) as 
compared to the cases c and d when K is high (6700). This shows transaction cost impacts poor 
borrowers relatively more who are believed to have low requirement of credit. E is higher than r 
for high transaction cost values and relatively low values of amount borrowed in most of the 
parameter combinations considered. However, these results depend to a great extent upon the size 
of installment as a percentage of amount borrowed. When installment size is one-half of the 
amount borrowed (3900), E is higher than r when Tc is more than 370 on an average (case a).With 
installment size of about 75% of amount borrowed (3900) as in case b, E is shown to be higher 
than r for Tc being in the range of (210, 400). In case c with K and s at 6700 and 3350 respectively, 
effective rate is lower than interest rate r in the entire range of Tc considered. However, if s is 
increased to 5000 (~70% of K) as in case d, E becomes higher than r when transaction costs lie in 
the range of (330, 400). 
Figure 3: Effective MFI interest rate as a function of transaction costs Tc 
 
Source: The author 
The graph in figure 4 shows effective interest rate E on Y-axis and installment size s on X-axis. 
The positive relation is found between increasing installment size s and effective interest rate E. 
However, the rate of change in effective interest rate is observed to be high (shown by steeper 
curve) when K is relatively small at 3900 as shown in the graphs of cases a and b. 
Figure 4: Effective MFI interest rate as a function of installment size s 
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Source: The author 
4.2 Simulation results on reservation MFI interest rate 
As in previous sub-section, we have four cases described in Table 2 below. We fix three parameters 
at a time and change any one of the parameters among s, K, Tc and m. These four cases on 
reservation MFI interest rate are shown in figures 5 till 8. 
Figure 5 shows reservation MFI interest rate as a function of ML interest rate. With m values 
varying in the range of (1, 2), reservation r* is positive beyond a certain threshold of m. When K 
is relatively low at 3900 and installment size being one half of it, reservation r* becomes positive 
when m crosses a threshold of 1.18 given transaction cost level of 350 as in case a. A decrease in 
transaction cost level to 290 in case b leads to lower corresponding threshold m of 1.15. 
The threshold m beyond which reservation r* becomes positive is lower in case of higher K (6700). 
For given values of K and s at 6700 and 3350 respectively in cases c, d and e, higher transaction 
cost levels lead to increase in threshold m. Threshold m is 1.05 in case e, gets increased to 1.09 in 
case d and further to 1.10 in case c. 
Figure 5: Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of ML interest rate m 
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Source: The author 
Table 2: Parameter combinations considered in simulation results on reservation MFI 
interest rate 
Figure 5 Figure 6 
Fixed Variable          Fixed Variable 
s, K, Tc m (1, 2)         s, m, Tc    K (3800, 6800) 
a) K = 3900, s = 1950, Tc = 350 a) m = 1.1, s = 1950, Tc = 350 
b) K = 3900, s = 1950, Tc = 290 b) m = 1.1, s = 1950, Tc = 290 
c) K = 6700, s = 3350, Tc = 350 c) m = 1.1, s = 3350, Tc = 350 
d) K = 6700, s = 3350, Tc = 290 d) m = 1.1, s = 3350, Tc = 290 
e) K = 6700, s = 3350, Tc = 160 e) m = 1.1, s = 3350, Tc = 160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The author 
Figure 6 shows the reservation MFI interest rate as a function of amount borrowed K. The 
reservation r* is shown to be positive for high values of parameter K. In case a, r* becomes positive 
when K is greater than the level of 5450, while in case b it happens when K is greater than the 
level of 4850. At higher installment size values of 3350, r* is positive for K being higher than 4950 
when transaction cost is fixed at the level of 160 as in case e. An increase in transaction cost from 
160 to 290 leads to increase the threshold K from 4950 to 6250 (case d). A further increase in 
Figure 7 Figure 8 
Fixed Variable Fixed Variable 
m, Tc, K s (1500, 3500) m, K, s Tc (150, 400) 
a) m = 1.1, K = 6700, Tc = 350 a) m = 1.1, K = 6700, s = 3350 
b) m = 1.1, K = 6700, Tc = 290 b) m = 1.1, K = 6700, s = 4690 
c) m = 1.1, K = 6700, Tc = 160 c) m = 1.1, K = 3900, s = 1950 
d) m = 1.1, K = 3900, Tc = 350 d) m = 1.1, K = 3900, s = 2730 
e) m = 1.1, K = 3900, Tc = 290  
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transaction cost levels to 350 (case c) leads to negative r* for all the values of K in the range of 
(3800, 6800). 
Figure 6: Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of amount borrowed K 
 
Source: The author 
The graph in figure 7 shows reservation MFI interest rate as a function of installment size s.  A 
higher installment size reduces the reservation r* borrowers are willing to pay to MFI. For the 
given levels of K and m, a higher transaction cost leads to lower reservation r* and hence shifts 
the r* curve downwards as shown in the r* curves for cases a, b and c. This implies borrowers are 
willing to pay less interest rate for each level of installment size when there is an increased 
transaction cost burden. Reservation r* is negative for all values of s when the amount borrowed 
is low (K = 3900) as shown in cases d and e. 
Figure 7: Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of installment size s 
 
Source: The author 
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Figure 8 depicts reservation MFI interest rate as a function of transaction cost. With the given level 
of amount borrowed and ML interest rate, higher installment size reduces reservation interest rate. 
This is shown by graph for case b lying below the graph for case a and similarly graph for case d 
being below the graph for case c.  
Figure 8: Reservation MFI interest rate as a function of transaction cost Tc 
 
Source: The author 
The rate of change in reservation r* is low (curve is flatter) when the amount borrowed is high at 
6700 compared to the case when it is less (3900). It is shown by the graphs for case a and b being 
flatter than the corresponding graphs for case c and d. This implies reservation r* is more 
responsive to transaction cost levels for poor borrowers who are having low requirement of credit. 
5. Conclusion 
To conclude, the effective cost of borrowing from MFI is high whenever there is higher transaction 
cost, higher installment size (as a % of amount borrowed) and lower amount borrowed. An increase 
in amount borrowed leads to decrease in effective MFI interest rate, while a higher installment size 
and transaction cost leads to increase in effective interest rate. An increase in amount borrowed is 
associated with higher reservation interest rate, while the relation with respect to installment size 
and transaction cost is negative.  
These results show that effective cost of borrowing from MFI is higher for poor and marginal 
borrowers who are in need for smaller amount of credit, although these are the set of borrowers to 
whom MFI lending is designed to be targeted. It is primarily explained by the higher transaction 
cost burden when borrowers borrow from MFI. Therefore, from the policy standpoint, these results 
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reiterate the importance of reducing transaction costs to enhance borrower welfare as Bhatt and 
Tang (2001), Field and Pande (2008), Laureti (2012) and several other authors have pointed out. 
 
 
Appendix 1 
Computing effective MFI interest rate E* (equation 1) 
Amount borrowed (effective) = K - Tc 
Suppose A1 and A2 are the amount paid to MFI at the end of 1
st and 2nd period respectively.   E is 
the effective rate of interest. By IRR formula, we have the following: 
1 2
c
2
A A
K T
(1 E) (1 E)
  
 
 
1A s(1 r)   and 2A (K s)(1 r)   . Putting these values in the above equation yields the 
following: 
c
2
s(1 r) (K s)(1 r)
K T
(1 E) (1 E)
  
  
 
 
  2cK T (1 E) s(1 r)(1 E) (K s)(1 r)         
Put (1+E) = z and solve for z, 
  2cK T z s(1 r)z (K s)(1 r) 0        
 
   
 
2
c
c c
4(K s)(1 r) K T s(1 r)s(1 r)
z
2 K T 2 K T
     
      
 
Ignoring the negative sign and substituting the value of z yields, 
   
 
2 2
c c
c
4(K s)(1 r) K T s (1 r) s(1 r) 2 K T
E E*
2 K T
        
 

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E* is the effective MFI interest rate. 
For E* to have meaningful value, the term inside square root should be non-negative i.e. 
  2 2c4(K s)(1 r) K T s (1 r) 0        
With K > Tc (given that s K ), the above inequality always holds true. 
Appendix 2 
Comparative statics of effective MFI interest rate E*  
1. 
c
E *
T


 
 
    c c2
c c
E* 1 2(K s)(1 r)
K T 2 s(1 r) 2 K T
T 2 K T
     
         
    
 
where  
2 2
c4(K s)(1 r)(K T ) s (1 r)       
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c c
E* 1
2(K s)(1 r) K T s(1 r) s(1 r)
T 2 K T
         
  
 
c
E*
0
T


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Hence, there is a positive relation between Tc and E*, because K >= s and K > Tc. 
2. 
E *
K

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Appendix 3 
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Comparative statics of reservation MFI interest rate r* 
1. 
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